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THE ACCIDENTAL PREEMPTION STATUTE:  THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND 
DISPLACEMENT OF AGENCY REGULATION 
 
Maureen A. Weston
 
 
The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation’s 2013 Symposium focused on the 
role of the courts and judicial review in arbitration and mediation.  Considering this 
question, this Article examines the command of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) for 
courts to enforce private agreements to arbitrate and to confirm arbitral awards as 
judgments subject to limited grounds for vacatur, as the public judicial system is invoked 
to revere private arbitration agreements and awards—at times at the expense of 
significant public policy challenges and the displacement of agency regulatory 
procedures specifically designed to address public policy concerns.   
In a series of decisions, the United States’ Supreme Court (U.S. Supreme Court) 
has declared the FAA as establishing a national policy favoring arbitration and 
emphatically declared that Section 2 of the FAA, which simply provides for the judicial 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, preempts state law rules that directly conflict 
with the FAA, single out or discriminate against arbitration, or otherwise “stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
expansive interpretation of the FAA has resulted in the preemption of state legislative, 
judicial, and administrative laws, as well as the encroachment on federal legislative and 
administrative regulatory schemes.  The judicial system, as mandated by U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions, has applied the FAA so expansively as to favor arbitration beyond the 
congressional intent.  In short, the courts are used to elevate private arbitration contracts 
above state and even federal laws and administrative schemes specifically enacted for 
addressing public policy concerns.  Although a patchwork of industry-specific legislative 
proposals have been promulgated in reaction, seeking to “reverse” FAA over-
preemption, important statutory and administrative schemes are at risk of displacement 
by this general command to enforce private contracts under the Court’s standard of FAA 
preemption.   As an alternative to the multitude of specialized legislative responses 
seeking to restore regulatory authority, Congress must amend the FAA to explicitly 
define the statute’s intended reach and reverse the Court’s preemption trend.  
I. INTRODUCTION   
“[W]hen parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, 
the [Federal Arbitration Act] supersedes state laws lodging primary 
jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative.”1 
 
                                                 
 * Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. The author would like to thank the 
members of the Penn State University Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation, participants at the 
Symposium, and acknowledges the helpful comments from Professor Kristen Blankley and Jim Madison, 
Esq., and research assistance by Pepperdine law student Jeff Salvesen. 
 
1
 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008).    
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The U.S. Supreme Court has emphatically declared that Section 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), which simply provides for the judicial enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, preempts state law rules that directly conflict with the FAA, that single out 
or discriminate against arbitration, or that otherwise “stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”2  Southland v. Keating,3 the 1984 foundational 
case for the Court’s vast preemption doctrine, has been regarded even by members of the 
Court as wrongly decided but “workable.”4  The text of the 1925 law states nothing about 
preemption, and Congress unlikely intended to displace entire bodies of state and federal 
regulatory laws.  In fact, the FAA explicitly states that the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements is subject to the “[g]rounds as exist at law . . . for the revocation of any 
contract.”5  Among these laws of general applicability are state contract law defenses, 
including public policy, unconscionability, fraud and duress.  Despite these limiting 
parameters, the FAA has operated to invalidate numerous state laws and administrative 
schemes.   
The Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T v. Concepcion—that the FAA preempts a 
state law invalidating consumer arbitration contracts that ban class actions as 
unconscionable—has had a far wider impact than crippling collective action.6  Suggesting 
that the FAA preempts state administrative agency proceedings, the Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded for consideration “in light of AT&T” the California Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno7 that an employee subject to an 
arbitration agreement could pursue rights under the state labor code seeking assistance 
from the Labor Commissioner in wage dispute cases.
8
  The specter of the FAA’s 
preemption threatens to undermine state, as well as federal, regulatory and protective 
administrative schemes.  Increasingly, the FAA preemption doctrine is “unworkable” and 
unnecessarily constrains states’ ability to implement public policy.9 
                                                 
        
2
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).   
 
3
 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that § 2 applied in state and federal 
courts, and as such, “withdr[aws] the power of the state to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”  Thus, the FAA preempted the 
California state law that required judicial recourse for franchise claims.). 
 
4
 Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating 
that although wrong, Southland has not proved unworkable, and, as always, “Congress remains free to alter 
what we have done.  Today’s decision caps this Court’s effort to expand the FAA.”).   
 
5
 9 U.S.C. §2 (2006). 
 
6
 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  After AT&T, courts have cited the 
decision as binding upon the decision to enforce class action waivers, resulting in the elimination of 
numerous class action claims.  See Maureen A. Weston, Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion, 60 
U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 782 (2012) (citing the “rubber-stamp” effect of AT&T and following decisions).   
        
7
  Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011). 
        
8
  Id. at 496.    
 
9
 A number of scholars contend that Southland was wrongly decided. See David S. Schwartz, 
Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 67 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (2004) (noting that “no member of the Southland 
majority remained on the Court as of 1994, and five current members of the Court have at one time or 
another dissented from Southland. . . .”); David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of 
Congress Over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (2004) (asserting that “[t]he Federal Arbitration 
Act is unconstitutional as applied to the states—and no one has noticed . . . FAA preemption is nothing 
more or less than procedural regulation of state courts, and . . . Congress lacks the power to regulate 
procedures in state courts.”). 
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This Article examines the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s expansive 
interpretation of the FAA, which has resulted in the preemption of legislative, judicial, 
and administrative laws and regulatory schemes.  Section II briefly describes key FAA 
provisions addressing judicial enforcement and review of arbitration as well as the 
congressional purpose underlying the FAA.  Section III analyzes the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s FAA preemption doctrine, specifically as it impacts state and federal 
administrative regulatory schemes.  Section IV considers the patchwork of industry-
specific legislative, regulatory responses seeking to “reverse” FAA preemption.  The 
Article concludes by proposing, as an alternative to the multitude of specialized 
legislative responses seeking to return regulatory authority, that Congress amend the 
FAA to explicitly define the statute’s intended reach, and restore authority to the states, 
the province of local governance. 
II. FAA JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT AND VACATUR  
In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA in order to ensure that agreements to arbitrate 
disputes would be enforceable on the same basis as other contracts.
10
  The Act was 
needed to reverse the then judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements, which courts, 
in 1925, had regarded suspiciously as ‘ousting’ the court of its jurisdiction.  Business and 
trade associations had urged Congress to pass the FAA to establish a procedure in federal 
courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements, as provisions in business contracts, 
and of arbitral awards so that parties could resolve their disputes expeditiously and 
finally.
11
  Thus, in Section 2 of the FAA, Congress provided that:  
 
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.
12
 
                                                 
 
10
 See 9 U.S.C. §9 (2006).  See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 
(1991) ("[The FAA's] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements 
that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration 
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.").  
 
11
 See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal 
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 102–12 (2006) (describing the 
historical context of the FAA’s enactment and arguing that “[t]he purpose of the Arbitration Act was 
primarily to make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court and secondly to provide procedures 
that would make this enforcement process simple and expeditious, thereby enabling merchants to resolve 
their disputes more cheaply and easily.”).  See also 9 U.S.C. §3 (2006) (providing that “[i]f any suit or 
proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration . . . 
the court . . . shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has 
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement. . . .”).  See also Thomas V. Burch, Regulating 
Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1316-1320 (2011) (describing the Congressional 
purpose of the FAA).  
 
12
 9 U.S.C. §2 (2006) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has since ruled the FAA’s enforcement 
provisions apply in state as well as federal court.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.1, 10 (1984).   
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While FAA Section 2 provides for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, 
Section 10 of the statute operates to ensure the finality of arbitral awards by authorizing 
limited grounds upon which a court may review or vacate an arbitral award, for reasons 
such as fraud or undue means, an arbitrator’s evident partiality or misconduct in the 
proceedings, or where an arbitrator acts in excess of his or her authority.
13
  These grounds 
are significantly “[n]arrower than the standards for appellate review in a judicial case 
where a court reviews a lower court’s legal rulings de novo and factual findings for clear 
error.”14 
In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
15
 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Section 10 of the FAA provided the exclusive grounds for judicial vacatur and 
modification of arbitral awards covered under the Act.
16
  The Court rejected the 
contention that the FAA’s requirement to enforce arbitration contracts as written permits 
private parties to contract to expand the scope of judicial review beyond the grounds 
enumerated in the FAA.
17
  While Hall Street seemingly resolved the question regarding 
the ability of private parties to expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards, the 
Court alluded to the possibility of “other possible avenues” for judicial review of 
arbitration awards.
18
  Causing confusion, the Court avoided discussing the continued 
viability of judicially recognized standards of review such as “manifest disregard of the 
law” or the availability of state law for expanded judicial review; and whether state courts 
are bound to apply the restrictive interpretations of Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.
19
  
Accordingly, the circuit courts of appeals have divided.
20
  
 Whether courts may continue to review arbitral awards on grounds beyond those 
set forth in Section 10 or through judicially recognized standards for manifest disregard 
of the law or violation of public policy, the bar to vacate an arbitration award remains 
high.  Indeed, petitions for vacatur of arbitral awards rarely prevail.
21
   Arbitration awards 
                                                 
 
13
 9 U.S.C. §10(a) (2006) (“In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district 
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to 
the arbitration (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was 
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any 
party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made . . . .”). 
 
14
 Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral 
Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 933–34 (2010) [hereinafter Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall 
Street] (citing Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x 186 (10th Cir. 2009)). 
        
15
 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 
16
 Id. at 592 (“The FAA confines its expedited judicial review to the grounds listed in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 
and 11.”). 
 
17
 Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street, supra note 14, at 932. 
 
18
 Hall St. Assocs., LLC, 552 U.S. at 590. 
 
19
 Id.   
 
20
 See Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick Mulligan, 440 Fed. App’x. 612, 618-19 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(summarizing circuit split regarding the continued viability of “manifest disregard of the law” as grounds 
for vacatur).  Some courts consider that manifest disregard is subsumed within the Section 10 categories as 
part of exceeding authority, while other courts consider the judicially recognized standard to stand alone.   
 
21
 J. Lani Bader, Thomas Brewer, Lawrence Mills & Peggy J. Williams, Vacating Arbitration Awards, 
11 DISP. RESOL. MAG 23, 25 (2005) (reporting that of the 182 state and federal court cases between 
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are virtually unreviewable on the merits and are rarely vacated.  Those making judicial 
challenges to arbitration awards face a “high risk of sanctions” for frivolous appeals.22   
Perhaps this result effectuates the FAA’s purpose and the parties’ agreement to submit 
disputes to arbitration.  Finality is regarded as a primary benefit of arbitration and that is, 
after all, what parties presumably agreed to secure. Yet each year scores of petitions are 
filed seeking vacatur. Very few are successful.  For the most part, once in arbitration, 
parties are locked into the system of limited judicial review, arbitral immunity, and 
finality.
23
  It would thus seem incumbent to ensure that parties enter into arbitration 
knowingly and voluntarily.  Further, the arbitration process is presumed to simply 
provide ‘another forum,’ but parties are still to be able to vindicate their legal rights in 
that system.
24
 
Here’s the rub.  The only significant judicial vacatur occurring is through the 
preemption of judicial rulings, state laws, and in some cases, federal laws that are deemed 
rarely in direct conflict with arbitration, but merely “anti-arbitration.”25  In the same year 
that Hall Street was decided, the Court announced in Preston v. Ferrer, that “[w]hen 
parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the FAA supersedes state 
laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative.”26  
That decision received far less attention than Hall Street, but the impact of Preston is 
arguably far more reaching, if not encroaching, upon public governance than the private 
conduct limited in Hall Street.
27
 While the courts largely stay away from reviewing 
arbitral awards, courts are called to be actively involved in enforcing agreements to 
arbitrate, even when such action involves displacing procedures under state and federal 
laws.   
                                                 
January 1, 2004 and October 31, 2004 in which a motion to vacate an arbitration award was filed, 37 (20%) 
of them were vacated and 145 (80%) were confirmed.  The authors reported that the frequency of 
successful vacatur applications was significantly higher in state court cases 31 (25.8%), compared to 6 
(9.7%) of the federal cases studied.  Of the vacated state court cases, 71% were decided in either New 
York, California, Connecticut, or Massachusetts.  The grounds asserted for seeking vacatur included that 
the arbitrators had “exceeded their powers” was the most successful grounds claimed, succeeding 
approximately 20% of the time.  Conversely, manifest disregard for the law, though second most frequently 
advanced, had the lowest vacatur success rate of all rationales studied, succeeding only 4% of the time.).  
More recent empirical data conducted since the 2004 study can be found at http://millsadr.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/When_Arbitrators_Exceed_Their_Powers_April_2009.pdf. 
 
22
 See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc., Nos. 12-2308 & 12-2623 (7th Cir., March 18, 
2013) (denying sanctions only because the contract’s loser-pay provision was enforced, and reminding 
litigants that “challenges to commercial arbitral awards bear a high risk of sanctions.”  Moreover, 
“[a]ttempts to obtain judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision undermine the integrity of the arbitral 
process.  Because of Johnson’s appeal, Edman has been deprived not only of the value of the 
distributorship it expected to have for Panama, but also part of the value of the arbitration to which both 
parties agreed.”). 
       
23
 See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and 
Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449 (2004) 
 
24
 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citation omitted). 
 
25
 See Ian D. Mitchell & Richard A. Bales, Concepcion and Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 4 PENN ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 9 (2012). 
 
26
 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008). 
 
27
 See also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempted California 
statute that required administrative adjudication of wage claims prior to arbitration).  
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III. FAA PREEMPTION AND IMPACT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
The FAA, the authority for which agreements to arbitrate are enforced and which 
makes arbitral awards virtually final, has become the basis to preempt the operation of 
state and potentially even federal laws, threatening to displace the ability of state courts 
or legislatures to govern or exercise the federalism principles of the Tenth Amendment.  
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law preempts, and thus 
invalidates, conflicting state law.  The FAA does not contain an express preemption 
clause, and the historical background of Section 2 suggests that Congress intended only 
to ensure the enforcement of commercial parties’ agreements to arbitrate.28   Nonetheless, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has on numerous occasions ruled that the FAA preempts state 
laws that not only attempt to regulate agreements to arbitrate or the arbitration process, 
but also laws of general applicability that may affect arbitration.
29
   
A. FAA Implied Preemption Doctrine 
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA applies in state and federal court 
and preempts conflicting state law, citing the Act’s jurisdictional basis under the 
Commerce Clause.
30
  As such, the Court in Southland v. Keating held that the FAA 
“withdr[aws] the power of the state to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims 
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”31  Thus, the FAA 
preempted the California state law that required judicial recourse for franchise claims.  
Lacking an express preemptive intent, FAA preemption is implied based on the broadest 
form of “conflict preemption,” which generally warrants narrow construction.   Since 
Southland, the preemption doctrine has become an oft-used mechanism for the Supreme 
Court to overturn state legislation that not only invalidate arbitration agreements or single 
out arbitration agreements for different treatment than other contracts, but increasingly to 
overturn state laws deemed as “hostile” towards arbitration.32   
                                                 
 
28
 See 9 U.S.C. §2 (2006). 
 
29
 See, e.g., Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)  (interstate commerce); 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995)  (FAA preemption of state law 
requiring judicial resolution of claims involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 
(1987)  (FAA preemption of state-law requiring judicial forum for wage disputes); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (FAA preemption of state statute's requiring judicial forum for franchisee 
disputes). 
 
30
 The proposition that the FAA is more than a procedural statute and applies in state courts has been 
the subject of much criticism, including by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and O’Connor, because the express 
language of § 4 directs a U.S. district court to compel arbitration of a valid arbitration agreement.  9 U.S.C. 
§ 4 (2006).  Yet, based on stare decisis, the FAA preemptive effect has been accepted and enforced in 
numerous arbitration cases.   See, e.g., Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  
 
31
 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10 (1984) (held that § 2 applied in state and federal courts, and as such, 
“withdr[aws] the power of the state to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the 
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”).  Thus, the FAA preempted the California state law 
that required judicial recourse for franchise claims. 
         
32
 See Mitchell & Bales, supra note 25; W. Mark Weidemaier, The Federal Arbitration Act:  Federal 
Preemption of State Law Regulating Arbitration,  ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE  (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb0505.pdf. 
65 
 
B. Arbitration and Administrative Procedures 
The vast preemptive effect accorded to the FAA poses a risk to deny access to, 
and the operation of, administrative agency procedures specifically established to handle 
certain claims.  The parties in Preston were subject to the California Talent Agent Act 
(TAA), which provided exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Commissioner to decide 
disputes involving agent fee claims against performers but also provided for de novo 
review to the district court.
33
  The Court ruled that the administrative scheme would 
likely postpone arbitration and thus conflicted with the FAA.  Rejecting that the TAA 
merely required an exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court stated that the FAA 
overrides “not only state statutes that refer certain state-law controversies initially to a 
judicial forum, but also state statutes that refer certain disputes initially to an 
administrative agency.”34  Is the Court correct with its pronouncement that “[w]hen 
parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the FAA supersedes state 
laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative?”35  
Moreover, is the general rule to exhaust administrative remedies an obstacle to 
arbitration, thereby requiring FAA preemption?
36
  
Despite Preston’s pronouncement that the FAA preemption includes 
administrative schemes that may delay arbitration, in 2011, the California Supreme Court 
in Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc., v. Frank Moreno,
37
 held that an employee could pursue his 
wage claim for unpaid vacation pay under the state administrative proceeding as a pre-
requisite to arbitration.  The California Labor Code codifies a statutory procedure where 
an employee may either sue for nonpayment of wages or file a complaint with the Labor 
Commissioner, who has the option to sue itself on the worker’s behalf in an 
administrative “Berman” hearing.38  A decision from the administrative hearing may be 
appealed de novo in the trial court, but an employer must post bond.  A successful 
employee is entitled to attorney’s fees, and the Labor Commissioner represents 
employees.    
In Sonic, Frank Moreno signed a document which required binding arbitration 
under the FAA as a condition of employment.  Moreno later filed an administrative wage 
claim pursuant to the Labor Code.  Sonic sought to compel arbitration, arguing that the 
employee had waived his rights under the state administrative scheme.  The California 
Supreme Court held that the attempted waiver of the employee’s right to a Berman 
hearing was invalid as unconscionably contrary to public policy favoring the prompt 
payment of wages.  Further, the right to the administrative hearing was not preempted by 
the FAA, as it does not preclude arbitration but simply affects the timing.  The binding 
contractual arbitration clause was a valid alternative to the de novo appeal of the 
administrative wage award.  The California Supreme Court interpreted Preston to involve 
the question of whether the Labor Commissioner or arbitrator would initially decide the 
Talent Agency Act question (a question of primary jurisdiction); whereas, this case 
                                                 
 
33
 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 354 (2008). 
 
34
 Id. at 349. 
 
35
 Id. at 359. 
 
36
 See id. 
 
37
 See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 51 Cal. 4th 659 (2011). 
 
38
 Id. at 672 (“The Berman hearing procedure is designed to provide a speedy, informal, and affordable 
method of resolving wage claims.”) (quoting Cuadra v. Millan, 17 Cal. 4th 855, 858 (1998)).   
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challenged the arbitration clause itself.  The court likened the Labor Commissioner’s role 
in this case to that of an agency recognized in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., “not as 
adjudicator but as prosecutor, pursuing an enforcement action in its own name or 
reviewing a discrimination charge to determine whether to initiate judicial 
proceedings.”39  Waffle House40 held that a mandatory arbitration clause in the 
employment contract did not bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 
pursuing victim-specific remedies for discrimination, such as back-pay, reinstatement, 
and damages, in an American with Disabilities Act (ADA) enforcement action.
41
  It 
recognized that while the FAA does favor arbitration, the ADA authorizes pursuit of 
remedies, and the arbitration clause does not bind anyone other than parties to the clause.  
Similarly, the Labor Code in Sonic required the Labor Commissioner to act on an 
employee’s behalf in an appeal of the administrative decision.   
Like the Sonic court, other courts have been hesitant to find a state administrative 
scheme in conflict with or displaced by the FAA.  In addition to the policy favoring 
arbitration, the court in Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc. v. Charles A. Bott, Inc.,
42
 
recognized that “[t]here also exists in the courts a long-standing public policy of 
hesitancy to interfere with administrative proceedings before all administrative remedies 
have been exhausted.”43  The case involved a claim of unfair termination of an 
automobile dealership.  Under state law, the State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, 
Dealers and Salespersons had jurisdiction to hear such complaints.  The court noted that 
such an administrative tribunal was specifically established to deal with such claims and 
the concern of the Southland Court, to prevent forum shopping, was wholly inapplicable. 
Further, the court stated that while the FAA requires a stay of judicial proceedings where 
one party moves to compel arbitration, it does not specify a stay of administrative 
proceedings. It added, “[i]nterpreting Southland as extending to claims brought in 
administrative tribunals as well as in state and federal courts would result in the FAA 
being more preemptive of state law than if we interpret the holding 
of Southland narrowly. Preemption is not favored unless compelled by explicit 
congressional intent.”44 
 
 
C. Impact of AT&T v. Concepcion on Administrative Proceedings 
 
Two months after the decision in Sonic, the U.S. Supreme Court issued AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, holding that the FAA preempted the state court’s ruling 
deeming class action waivers unconscionable, because it “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress [in the 
FAA] . . . . ”45  The AT&T decision triggered substantial controversy in its apparent 
                                                 
 
39
 Sonic 51 Cal. 4th  at 691. 
        
40
 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 
41
 Id. at 298. 
        
42
 Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distribs., Inc. v. Charles A. Bott, Inc., 515 A.2d 633 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). 
 
43
 Id. at 636. 
 
44
 Id. at 637 (noting that the Court ultimately interpreted that the parties’ arbitration agreement was 
worded too narrowly and that the dispute was not covered by the FAA.). 
 
45
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
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acceptance that the FAA authorizes private parties, by the strike of a pen, to eviscerate 
class actions in court or in arbitration.  Its preemptive effect has rippled even farther.
 46
 
After AT&T, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sonic, summarily 
vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to the California Supreme Court, to 
consider in light of the AT&T ruling, whether the state administrative wage proceedings 
are inconsistent with the FAA.  While Sonic remains pending at the time of this writing, 
the remand certainly signals that the FAA could displace state administrative procedures, 
such as those accorded under the Labor Code.
47
   
 FAA preemption may also affect federal agency adjudication and rulemaking.  
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is charged with regulating the 
securities markets and broker dealings.  Under FINRA rules, class action waivers are 
prohibited.
48
  In Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. v. FINRA,
49
 Schwab & Co. sought to enjoin 
application of the FINRA rule, in an effort to enforce class action waivers in Schwab 
customer account contracts, arguing that the FAA preempts the FINRA rule under AT&T 
Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion.
50
  The district court dismissed this case because of the duty 
to exhaust administrative remedies, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, noting the benefits of 
this process included “the expertise and intimate familiarity with complex securities 
operations which members of the industry can bring to bear on regulatory problems, and 
the informality of self-regulatory procedures.”51  The FINRA Panel thereafter concluded, 
in FINRA’s disciplinary action against Schwab, that Schwab’s contractual class waiver 
provisions violate and conflict with FINRA rules preserving judicial class actions.
52
  
Nonetheless, it determined the FINRA rule could not be enforced due to the interpretation 
of the FAA under AT&T, as “[r]ules that override an agreement to arbitrate and allow a 
party to an arbitration agreement to avoid arbitration represent the kind of ‘hostility’ to 
arbitration the Supreme Court has repeatedly found inappropriate and unenforceable 
under the FAA.”53 The Panel considered the Supreme Court’s FAA decisions “to mean 
that countervailing policy concerns that might counsel against arbitration of a particular 
kind of dispute – whether state or federal, statutory or regulatory – cannot override the 
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FAA’s mandate unless there is a clear expression of congressional intent to carve out an 
exception to the FAA.”54  
 
D. Continued FAA Preemption 
The U.S. Supreme Court has adhered to its broad interpretation of the FAA, 
issuing three additional FAA preemption decisions in its 2011–12 term, which impact 
both state and federal law.  Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown
55
 ruled that the 
FAA preempted a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals’ rule that voided, as against 
public policy, pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to 
negligence claims.
56
  The state rule invalidating arbitration clauses in Marmet “singled 
out” arbitration in direct conflict with the FAA.57   
In Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard,
58
 the Court held that the FAA’s 
enforcement provision preempted the state law invalidating non-competition agreements 
in employment contracts as contrary to public policy.
59
  The Nitro decision is consistent 
with the separability doctrine of Buckeye Check Cashing, holding that the FAA, not state 
law, governs the enforceability of an arbitration clause (severable) from an employment 
contract containing a non-competition provision.
60
  Thus, the challenge must target the 
arbitration clause itself, as opposed to the contract as a whole.  The Court rejected the 
Oklahoma State Supreme Court’s reasoning that the state’s statute specifically governing 
the validity of covenants not to compete must govern over the FAA, a more general 
statute favoring arbitration.  Curiously, the Court addressed the “[a]ncient interpretive 
principle that the specific governs the general (generalia specialibus non derogant),” 
stating that this principle applies only “to conflict between laws of equal dignity . . . 
where a specific state statute conflicts with a general federal statute . . . ,” the latter 
governs.
61
   Not only does this reading undermine specific state administrative procedures 
designed to address specialized areas, the Court broadly interpreted the FAA’s 
application over other federal statutes.     
In considering the FAA’s interaction with respect to claims arising under the 
federal Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), which provides for a “right to sue,” 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
62
 held such claims arbitrable under the FAA and 
stated that CROA’s requirement that credit repair organizations notify consumers that 
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they “have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair 
Organization Act” does not reflect congressional intent to preclude arbitration of claims 
arising under the Act.
63
  
IV. CONTINUED CHALLENGES TO PREEMPTION  
A. State Schemes Weakened 
AT&T’s preemption ruling has reached beyond the supplanting of state laws 
invalidating class waiver clauses in arbitration contracts.  There is a split in the California 
courts on whether the FAA preempts state private attorney general actions (PAGA), but 
the trend favors preemption.
64
  In a PAGA action, private citizens are “deputized” as 
private attorney generals to bring representative actions as a means for public 
enforcement of the Labor Code. In Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., the Court considered 
the PAGA claimant’s role as a proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies, 
similar to the EEOC, not to be barred by an employee’s arbitration agreement to file suit 
under the federal anti-discrimination laws.
65
  Brown stated that “AT&T does not purport 
to deal with the FAA’s possible preemption of contractual efforts to eliminate 
representative private attorney general actions to enforce the Labor Code.”66  Yet, more 
recently, the same court ruled that the FAA does preempt PAGA actions.
67
 A similar 
trend results in FAA preemption where class claims seek public injunctive relief under 
state law.
68
   
Applying AT&T’s decision to invalidate the Labor Code process in Moreno could 
also impact state administrative schemes, such as those provided in Fair Housing, 
Employment/Labor, Agriculture, and Worker’s Compensation laws.  A state bar 
administrative scheme that provides for arbitration of attorney fee disputes before the 
state bar could also be at risk of preemption.  
B.  FAA and Vindication of Federal Statutory Rights 
In its 2012–13 Term, the Court will address the question of whether the FAA’s 
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written (except, of course, if they purport to 
expand judicial review), applies where the enforcement would effectively deprive 
claimants of their ability to “vindicate” their federal statutory rights.   The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly stated that arbitration is simply another forum for the resolution of 
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disputes, but by agreeing to arbitrate, parties do not forgo their substantive rights.
69
  This 
argument was essentially rejected in AT&T with respect to the claims that class 
proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that otherwise would go un-
redressed.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has remained steadfast in 
refusing to enforce a class action waiver in the arbitration contract between merchants 
and American Express, where the practical effect of the enforcement of the waiver would 
bar plaintiffs from pursuing their statutory claims.  Finding that plaintiffs could not 
effectively vindicate their rights due to the prohibitively high costs of individual 
arbitration, In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation70 ruled that AT&T did not 
compel enforcement of the class waiver.
71
  The Second Circuit stated that AT&T 
“[p]lainly offers a path for analyzing whether a state contract law is preempted by the 
FAA.”72  Its holding, by contrast, rested squarely on “[a] vindication of statutory rights 
analysis . . . .”73 
The vindication of statutory rights concern has similarly guided other courts in 
denying enforcement of class waivers.  The Second Circuit in Chen-Oster v. Goldman, 
Sachs & Co.,
74
 denied enforcement where the plaintiff’s Title VII federal statutory 
pattern and practice discrimination claim could only be pursued on a class basis.
75
  A 
similar rationale applied to preclude the contractual waiver of class claims under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
76
   Pending review before the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the National Labor Relations Board decision in D.R. Horton Inc. v. Cuda,
77
 
ruled that employers violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which 
provides workers the right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection, 
when they require, as a condition of employment, an employee to sign an agreement 
foreclosing class action claims and requiring all disputes with the employer to be decided 
in binding arbitration.
78
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Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.,
79
 also involved an employee’s FLSA lawsuit seeking 
class certification while subject to an arbitration agreement that included a class action 
waiver.  The Eighth Circuit did not find D.R. Horton consistent with AT&T or other 
circuit courts.  It distinguished D.R. Horton on the basis that the Bristol Care 
employment agreement did not prohibit the employee from seeking redress with the 
EEOC, the NLRB, or other agencies.  The court upheld the arbitration agreement, 
including its class action waiver.
80
   In Parisi v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
81
 the Second 
Circuit upheld a class waiver in an employment arbitration agreement, even though the 
plaintiff contended that arbitration on an individual basis would prevent her from 
pursuing “a pattern-or-practice claim” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82  
In so ruling, the Second Circuit stated—on a ground more pertinent to discrimination 
claims than to arbitration law—that “‘pattern-or-practice’ refers to a method of proof and 
does not constitute a ‘freestanding cause of action.’”83  
The Court emphasized the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, “even when 
the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been 
‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’”84  It added that “[e]ven claims 
arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated 
because ‘so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum,’ the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and 
deterrent function.”85  
The Court noted that it and other circuits have found two circumstances in which 
motions to compel arbitration must be denied because “arbitration would prevent 
plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights.”86  First, as in American Express, the 
Second Circuit held that a class waiver was unenforceable because it would “effectively 
preclude” plaintiffs from bringing their antitrust claims.87 Second, the Second Circuit 
recognized cases altering or invalidating arbitration agreements “where they interfered 
with the recovery of statutorily authorized damages” (e.g., where the arbitration clause 
restricted damages in a way contrary to a statute).
88
   
By contrast, the Second Circuit in Bristol Care determined that the arbitral forum 
would permit the plaintiff to prove her statutory claims, including by offering “evidence 
of discriminatory patterns, practices or policies.”89  Interestingly, the Second Circuit 
issued its decision on March 21, 2013, after the oral arguments, but before the U.S. 
Supreme Court rules in American Express in June 2013. 
Depending upon how the Supreme Court rules in American Express, the FAA’s 
preemptive force could displace not only state, but also federal law.  Even if the Court 
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were to uphold the Second Circuit’s “vindication of rights” decision in American 
Express, it likely would apply only to federal rights, despite a similar concern for state 
rights.  The potential exists for a discrepancy in enforcing arbitration agreements that 
displace state laws which, for example, regard class waivers as unconscionable or provide 
a process for administrative recourse of particular claims as Moreno did, yet allow 
vindication only for federal rights.
90
  Either outcome makes little sense.   
C. Legislative Attempts to “Reverse” FAA Preemption 
Under the FAA preemption doctrine, states are largely inept to enact protective 
legislation.  In response to considerable criticism of the enforcement of mandatory 
arbitration contracts in consumer, employment, and various commercial settings, 
Congress has enacted piecemeal legislation to address specific consumer protection and 
policy concerns.
91
  To preserve a state’s ability to continue its traditional role to license 
and regulate the insurance industry, the McCann Ferguson Act reverses the presumption 
of FAA preemption in insurance contracts.
92
  
 In response to the public outcry in Jones v. Halliburton Co.,
93
 which enforced 
arbitration of a defense contractor’s female employee’s claim of sexual assault while in 
Iraq, Congress passed the "Franken Amendment," which bars many defense contractors 
and subcontractors from using pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of 
employment.  Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Consumer Reform and Wall Street Protection 
Act of 2010, invalidates pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate certain whistleblower claims 
brought against public companies and many financial services institutions.
 
 The proposed 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 would invalidate pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate any 
kind of employment, consumer or civil rights matter. 
As Professor Thomas Burch notes in his comprehensive study, over 139 
arbitration reform bills have been introduced in Congress since 1995.
94
  Clearly, the 
Supreme Court’s FAA preemption doctrine is not working.  A clear statement by 
Congress reinforcing the FAA’s original purpose to enforce voluntary arbitration 
agreements, within the bounds of state and federal law, is warranted. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
 
The rationale for determining that a private arbitration contract controls over a 
statutorily prescribed administrative agency review is certainly not evident in the 1925 
Act.  The FAA was hardly intended to displace an entire body of law that did not even 
exist at its enactment.  Ironically, parties cannot agree to expand the scope of judicial 
review of their private dispute, but, by virtue of an agreement to arbitrate, can oust states 
from governance and even federal law not explicitly reversing the presumption of FAA 
arbitrability.  And the courts are called to enforce such results.
95
  The Supreme Court has 
“created an FAA monster”96 in according it such vast preemption treatment, and impaired 
the ability of states to enact protective schemes.  Absent a direct conflict or congressional 
intent to occupy the field, the interpretive principle that the specific govern over the 
general accords with constitutional, as opposed to FAA, preemption doctrine.  The 
impact on state administrative schemes is particularly troubling, as these processes are 
generally designed to address power imbalances and to provide expeditious and 
accessible resolution of common disputes. 
The impact of AT&T is not fully known and certainly evokes concern about the 
scope of its application.  Just as AT&T may be the death knell of class actions, it appears 
to infect other areas of state legislation and governance.
97
  The vast preemption doctrine 
causes unintended and unnecessary intrusion upon federalism and increasing piecemeal 
congressional legislation and proposals to “reverse” the misplaced reach of the FAA.  It 
is past time for Congress to amend the FAA to explicitly define the statute’s intended 
reach and to restore the ability of parties to vindicate their rights and of government to 
govern.    
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